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Introduction  
 
My name is Kieran McEvoy. I am Professor of Law and Transitional Justice at the 
School of Law and the Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, 
Security & Justice, Queen’s University Belfast. I have conducted extensive 
international comparative work on the relationship between prosecutions, truth 
recovery and amnesties in processes of conflict transformation. For a number of 
years, I have also been leading a programme of work with colleagues at Ulster 
University and the local human rights non-governmental organisation in Northern 
Ireland (the Committee on the Administration of Justice) designed to assist 
political parties and civil society organisations on the technical aspects of the 
‘dealing with the past’ debate in Northern Ireland.1 Dealing with the past in the 
aftermath of conflict inevitably involves engaging in sensitive, controversial and 
legally complex matters. Our role was to provide a useful public service by offering 
technical and legal information in an accessible fashion on how to deal with the 
past in a human rights compliant manner. Individuals and groups cancan thus 
make decisions based on maximum knowledge and information. 
 
To that end, we have directly briefed the largest political parties in Northern 
Ireland, all of whom were involved in the Stormont House Agreement negotiations. 
We also worked closely with the British and Irish governments on many of the 
technical aspects of this debate. Furthermore, we have delivered extensive 
briefings to civil society and victims’ organisations, former police officers, ex-
prisoners and others with an interest in these matters. We have also worked 
closely with the Commission for Victims and Survivors.  
 
As members will be aware, the Stormont House Agreement proposed the 
establishment of four mechanisms designed to cumulatively address the legacy of 
the past in Northern in Northern Ireland. These are: 
 
 Historical Investigations Unit (HIU) 
 Independent Commission on Information Retrieval (ICIR) 
 Implementation and Reconciliation Group (IRG) 
 Oral History Archive (OHA) 
 
In September 2015, at an event in the House of Lords sponsored by Labour Peer 
and former NIO minister Lord Dubs, we formally launched our version of a 
Stormont House Agreement Model Implementation Bill on the past-related aspects 
                                                 
1 For further details of the project, those involved and the various reports and briefing 
documents see https://amnesties-prosecution-public-interest.co.uk/  
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of the SHA.2 The latter was prepared by our team, working together with former 
British Ambassador and legal advisor to the Consultative Group on the Past, 
Jeremy Hill, and the very experienced Parliamentary Draftsperson, Daniel 
Greenberg LLB.  Since that launch we have continued to work on a range of further 
challenging issues related to the implementation of the legacy aspects of the 
Stormont House Agreement.   
 
A commitment by the British government to enact legislation to implement the 
SHA was included in the Queens Speech in 2015. Political progress to establish 
these mechanisms has been stalled on a number of fronts, in particular with regard 
to balancing issues related to national security and the disclosure of information 
to families who have lost loved ones as a result of the conflict. These matters will 
feature in political negotiations commencing this week in Northern Ireland. 
 
Summary of Issues 
 
I have been invited by the Defence Select Committee to address a number of 
specific matters related to the legacy of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. This 
paper is structured around the themes identified to me by the Clerk of the 
Committee as being of interest to members in their deliberations.  I have also, as 
requested, attempted to address the requested issues in plain English - using non-
legalistic and non-academic terms insofar as possible.  
 
Finally, in addition to the suggested themes, I have also made a number of specific 
suggestions at the end of this paper that may assist in addressing concerns 
regarding prosecutions of former soldiers and police officers for historical offences. 
I believe that is possible to address such concerns within the terms of the 
Stormont House Agreement, whilst upholding the principles of the rule of law that 
are key to that Agreement. 
 
 
The International Criminal Court, Amnesties & International 
Law 
 
I have been asked to explore the relevance of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) and the use of amnesties in terms of the UK’s international legal obligations. 
Specific obligations arising from the European Convention of Human Rights are 
addressed in detail below. Before looking more closely at the ICC and the status 
                                                 
2 Stormont House Agreement: Model Implementation Bill (2015). Available at 
https://amnesties-prosecution-public-interest.co.uk/themainevent/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/SHA-Model-Implementation-Bill-September-2015-Final.pdf  
See also Stormont House Agreement Model Implementation Bill Explanatory Notes 
(2015) available at https://amnesties-prosecution-public-
interest.co.uk/themainevent/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/SHA-Model-Implementation-
Bill-Explanatory-Notes-Final.pdf  
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of amnesties in international law, I should like to make one important point. As 
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, James Brokenshire, stated in the 
House of Commons recently with regard to the Stormont House Agreement 
negotiations, ‘Amnesties were quickly dismissed by all the participants and are not 
the policy of this Government’.  Any move to introduce an amnesty (however 
described) would be outside the terms of the Stormont House Agreement and 
would represent a very dramatic change in policy on the part of the British 
government.  
International Criminal Court 
The UK government is a signatory to the treaty (known as the Rome Statute) 
which established the International Criminal Court (ICC) in July 2002. However, a 
number of factors render it of very limited relevance to the Northern Ireland 
context. 
 
(a) The ICC can only exercise jurisdiction over offences committed after the 
Rome Statute entered into effect.  For the United Kingdom, the Statute became 
effective with the Court’s establishment on 1 July 2002. Therefore, the Court has 
no jurisdiction over crimes committed during the Northern Ireland conflict. 
 
(b) A key principle of the ICC Statute is complementarity, i.e. that national 
prosecutors and national courts should address the most serious international 
crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide), where possible and that 
the ICC should be viewed as complementarity to such local processes, as a court 
of ‘last resort’. Only in instances where local prosecutors or courts cannot or will 
not prosecute the most serious international crimes can a case be deemed 
admissible before the ICC.  Thus, events related to Northern Ireland that took 
place after 1 July 2002 would only fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC, firstly, if 
such events reached the high threshold of either genocide or crimes against 
humanity (very unlikely), or could be considered war crimes (when arguably the 
conflict ended in 1998). Secondly, if this threshold was created, the Court could 
only exercise jurisdiction in a context where the local prosecutors and courts could 
not or would not deal with such events.  
 
(c) The Rome Statute does not contain a provision on amnesties. During the 
negotiations to establish the ICC, a number of countries argued that states needed 
to retain the inherent flexibility to grant amnesties as part of genuine efforts at 
truth recovery or conflict resolution. As a result of these arguments, no prohibition 
on amnesties was included in the Rome Statute.  
Is a Statute of Limitations Different to an Amnesty? 
While there are defined periods within which civil actions must be instigated under 
the Limitations Act 1980, there is no precedent in UK law of a statute of limitations 
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for serious criminal offences. However described, any measure which sought to 
bar criminal prosecutions and or civil liability with regard to the Northern Ireland 
Troubles against individuals or categories of individuals by reference to the time 
passed since the offence was committed (or to when an original investigation was 
completed), would be an amnesty by another name and would be judged against 
the criteria outlined below. 
Are Amnesties Lawful Under International Law? 
Definition – An amnesty is an exceptional legal measure which bars criminal 
prosecutions (and in some cases civil actions) against individuals or categories of 
individuals. Amnesties are distinct from pardons. A pardon is a legal act that 
exempts the convicted person in whole in part from the serving his or her sentence 
after he/she has been convicted.   
 
Amnesties continue to be widely used in peace-making efforts. Since 1945, there 
have been 615 amnesties introduced in over approximately 145 countries, at an 
average of 12 per year.  No international treaty explicitly prohibits amnesties. As 
a result, the status of amnesties under international law is generally evaluated for 
incompatibility with treaties prohibiting specific crimes (e.g. genocide, war crimes, 
torture), with interpretations of customary international law, and with the 
obligation to provide a remedy under international human rights law.  Amnesties 
that offer unconditional immunity to perpetrators of international crimes and 
serious human rights violations are widely recognised as unlawful. However, there 
is a widespread recognition that conditional amnesties (e.g. linked to truth 
recovery) - what the UN Secretary General has termed ‘carefully crafted 
amnesties’ - have a legitimate role in helping to end conflict.  In testing whether 
an amnesty is lawful under international law, a number of factors would normally 
be examined: 
 
1. If the relevant crimes committed are so grave that they are specifically 
prohibited by international treaties (e.g. genocide, war crimes, torture). 
2. Whether the amnesty is conditional and is part of a genuine effort to deal 
with the legacy of the past in a particular conflict (e.g. in trading amnesties in 
return for truth recovery).  
3. Whether the rights of victims to a remedy, to know the truth about what 
happened through an investigation of the facts and to possible reparations are 
being negated as a result of such an amnesty. 
4. Whether the relevant amnesty is what the UN has referred to as a ‘self-
amnesty’ i.e. wherein the state responsible is seeking to negate the criminal 
and/or civil liability of only state actors. Such actions are usually viewed as the 
‘epitome of impunity’, which the entire international human rights framework was 
designed to prevent.  States have a duty under international law to end such 
impunity.  
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Amnesties in the Northern Ireland Context 
Implications of International Law 
In the context of Northern Ireland, the implications of this are as follows. It is 
possible to design an amnesty which is compatible with international law. 
However:  
 
1. Such an amnesty could not include certain of the most serious crimes (in 
particular torture, which may be the most relevant in the Northern Ireland 
context).  
2. It would have to be part of a genuine effort to deal with the legacy of the 
past.  
3. It could not be done at the cost of negating the rights of victims to a 
remedy, to know the truth about what happened through an investigation 
(discussed further below re Article 2 and 3 of the ECHR) and to possible 
reparations.  
4. Even if the conditions on ensuring the rights of victims were met, it would 
be difficult to apply such an amnesty to state actors alone while meeting the 
state’s obligations in international law to prevent impunity.  
 
The devolved nature of the Northern Ireland Assembly presents further practical 
considerations, including whether or not a Legislative Consent Motion is required. 
Legislative Consent Motion 
In general, all justice and policing matters were transferred (devolved) to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly in 2010. Some justice matters remain reserved to 
Westminster including the prerogative of mercy in terrorism cases, illicit drug 
classification, the Serious Organised Crime Agency. In addition, some justice 
matters remain excepted and devolution was either not discussed or not 
considered feasible: extradition (as an international relations matter), military 
justice (i.e. discipline within the armed forces, as a defence matter), enforcement 
of immigration law by UK Visas and Immigration, and national security (including 
intelligence services). 
 
Mechanisms for dealing with the past, including those proposed under the 
Stormont House Agreement, are, in general devolved. In the Northern Ireland 
Office document summarising the proposed measures in the Northern Ireland 
(Stormont House Agreement) Bill 2015,3 the Government comments that: 
 
                                                 
3https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/462888
/Policy_Paper_-_Summary_of_Measures_23_Sept_2015_Final.pdf  
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The majority of the commitments in the Agreement, including some 
of those related to the past, deal with matters within the legislative 
competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly, and are the 
responsibility of the Northern Ireland Executive. However, in order 
to expedite the establishment of the legacy institutions, the 
Government has agreed to include the provisions outlined above in 
a single Bill before Parliament. 
The document goes on to say: 
In line with the convention that the UK Parliament will not normally 
legislate on a devolved matter without the consent of the devolved 
legislature, the UK Government is seeking a Legislative Consent 
Motion in respect of transferred matters. 
 
The convention to which the document refers is known as the “Sewel Convention” 
and the relevant part reads as follows: 
The UK Government will proceed in accordance with the convention 
that the UK Parliament would not normally legislate with regard to 
devolved matters except with the agreement of the devolved 
legislature. The devolved administrations will be responsible for 
seeking such agreement as may be required for this purpose on an 
approach from the UK Government”. (December 2001, Cm 5240, 
paragraph 13) 
“Agreement” in the case of a piece of legislation is through a “legislative consent 
motion” to be passed through the Assembly. Devolution Guidance Notice 8: Post-
Devolution Legislation Affecting Northern Ireland interprets the above convention 
and the Memorandum of Understanding between the UK Government and the 
devolved administrations for officials who may be considering bringing forward 
legislation. Paragraphs 4 and 5 contain the following text: 
 
III. Contains provisions applying to Northern Ireland and which deal 
with transferred matters (but not reserved or excepted matters), or 
which alter the legislative competence of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly or the executive functions of Northern Ireland Ministers or 
departments.  
 
Only Bills with provisions in category III are subject to the 
convention on seeking the   agreement of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly. 
 
The Supreme Court has recently made clear, however, that this constitutional 
convention operates in the political sphere and is not enforceable in the courts. In 
the Agnew and Others case (dealing with whether the consent of the NI Assembly 
was required to an Act implementing Brexit) the court ruled in the following terms: 
AMNESTIES, PROSECUTIONS & THE RULE OF LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
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The consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly is not a legal 
requirement before the relevant Act of the UK Parliament is passed. 
151. In  reaching  this  conclusion  we  do  not  underestimate  the  
importance  of constitutional conventions, some of which play a 
fundamental role in the operation of  our  constitution. The Sewel 
Convention has an important role in facilitating harmonious 
relationships between the UK Parliament and the devolved 
legislatures. But the policing of its scope and the manner of its 
operation does not lie within the constitutional remit of the 
judiciary, which is to protect the rule of law.4 
 
The position in relation to any “statute of limitations” on prosecutions relating to 
troubles-era cases is that a Westminster Act would require a legislative consent 
motion in the NI Assembly by constitutional convention but this convention is not 
enforceable in the courts. However, to override the convention in such a case 
would make the legislation even more controversial than it would already be. It 
would also contradict the UK Government’s assertion that “political consensus” in 
Northern Ireland is required before the UK Parliament will enact, for example, the 
Stormont House Agreement. Any such action outside the terms of the Stormont 
House Agreement would in all probability result in the dissolution of that 
Agreement.  
 
 
The Political & Legal Context of Legacy Investigations  
 
As requested, in this section, I have provided a very basic overview of some of 
the key Troubles-related data as well as some of the key challenges related to 
ongoing debates on historical prosecutions.  
Casualties 
The figures normally used for conflict related deaths in Northern Ireland tend to 
rely on a number of key academic and journalistic sources.5 These record an 
overall figure of between 3,523 and 3,635 deaths, and attribute around 2000 of 
these deaths as having been caused by republicans, around 1000 to loyalists, and 
                                                 
4 https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2016-0196-judgment.pdf  
5 M. Fay, M. Morrissey, and M. Smyth, Northern Ireland’s Troubles: the Human Costs 
(London, Pluto Press, 1999); M. Sutton (1994) Bear in Mind These Dead: An Index of 
Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland 1969-1993. Belfast: Beyond the Pale; C. Thornton, S. 
Kelter, B. Feeney, D. McKittrick (2001) Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and 
Children Who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles. Edinburgh: Mainstream 
Publishing.  
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around 360 to the security forces (including the Army).6  Figures relating to the 
status of victims during the conflict, from the same aforementioned studies, 
indicate that most of the victims, around 2,000, were civilians. Around 120-150 
loyalists and 360-390 republican paramilitaries lost their lives as did around 1,000 
members of the security forces. In relation to specific figures for the military, Lost 
Lives records that 503 British soldiers and 206 members of the UDR lost their 
lives.  
Historical Prosecutions 
As has been noted recently by the UN, definitive data on historical prosecutions 
during the troubles is difficult to access. 7   Officially cited estimates of the number 
of republican and loyalist prisoners prosecuted and imprisoned for conflict related 
offences range from around 20,000–40,000. 8  In relation to convictions of 
members of the military, precise figures are more quantifiable due to their small 
numbers.  
 
As noted above, the state was directly responsible for approximately 360 deaths, 
with the army being responsible for approximately 300 of these.9 Using court 
records (in particular inquest records), newspapers and other open sources, 
Professor Fionnuala Ní Aoláin (Ulster University and Minnesota Law School) 
created a database of a total of 350 people killed by state actors between 1969-
                                                 
6 However, it should be noted that these are deaths directly attributed to members of 
the security forces, and the figures do not include cases involving collusion. Obviously, 
any state actor involved in collusive activities could also be liable for historical 
prosecutions. By way of illustration, in a recent Police Ombudsman report, the 
Ombudsman documents the involvements of  paid state agents “at the most senior 
levels within Loyalist paramilitary organisations” including in the importation of large 
amounts of weapons from Apartheid South Africa in the mid to late 1980s. The 
Ombudsman further documents that, according to police figures, these weapons were 
used in at least 70 murders and attempted murders and that the weapons were 
imported when a Brian Nelson, a Force Research Unit (FRU – A British Army unit in the 
UDA) was dispatched to South Africa for this purpose. Office of the Police Ombudsman 
Northern Ireland (2016) The Murders at the Heights Bar Loughinisland, 18 June 1994, 
p445. Belfast: OPONI. Currently Chief Constable John Boutcher is leading a team of 48 
detectives investigating up to 50 murders involving the alleged state agent Stakeknife 
which is examining ‘the activities of current and former police officers, members of the 
army and MI5, and former members of the IRA.’ BBC News, 14th October 2016 
‘Stakeknife: Investigation May Result in Prosecutions.  
7 UN DOC A/HRC/34/62/Add.1, (UNSR Report 2016) Report Of The Special Rapporteur 
On The Promotion Of Truth, Justice, Reparation And Guarantees Of Non-Recurrence On 
His Mission To The United Kingdom Of Great Britain And Northern Ireland, 17 November 
2016.  Geneva: United Nations Britain and Northern Ireland, 17. November 2016, p12.  
8 OFMDFM ‘Report of the Review Panel, Employers’ Guidance on Recruiting People with 
Conflict-Related Convictions’, March 2012, page 14.   
9 M. McKeown (2001) Post-Mortem An examination of the patterns of politically 
associated violence in Northern Ireland during the years 1969-2001 as reflected in the 
fatality figures for those years. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/victims/mckeown/mckeown01.pdf. 
p.14   
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1994.10 Many of these deaths occurred in the early (and most violent) period of 
the conflict. Between 1969 and 1974, 189 people were killed by state actors, the 
majority (170) by the army. There were no criminal prosecutions levied against 
state actors during this period.11 According to the database produced by Professor 
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, 63% of those killed were undisputedly unarmed at the time 
of death, 12% (24 people) were confirmed as having been in possession of a 
weapon and a further 14 deaths were listed as being ‘possibly armed’. 12 As the 
official Operation Banner review notes, only a dozen or so serious cases involving 
Army personnel killing or injuring others came to court during the 30 years of the 
Troubles.13 In relation to operational shootings the report cites 4 convictions for 
murder, one of which was overturned on retrial.14 These figures to not appear to 
include members of the Ulster Defence Regiment. 15   
Contemporary Prosecutions 
There has been some critical commentary concerning a perceived imbalance in 
conflict related prosecutions against state actors since the Good Friday 
Agreement, particularly since the current Director of Public Prosecutions took up 
his post in 2011. The DPP recently issued a statement detailing the following.  
 
 There have been 17 prosecutorial decisions on legacy related cases since 
2011. 
 8 cases relate to alleged offences attributed to republicans, in 7 of the cases 
decisions were taken to prosecute;  
 3 cases relate to loyalists and have resulted in prosecutions;  
 3 cases relate to soldiers, two of these have resulted in decisions to 
prosecute and one a decision not to prosecute.  
 3 cases relate to police officers, in two decisions were taken not to 
prosecute.16    
                                                 
10 F. Ní Aoláin (2000) The Politics of Force. Conflict Management of State Violence in 
Northern Ireland. Belfast: Blackstaff Press.  
11 F. Ní Aoláin (2000) ‘The Politics of Force: Conflict Management and State Violence in 
Northern Ireland - A Brief Historical Overview.’ Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 12-12, p.23. 
12 Ibid. 
13 British Army (2006) An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland. Available 
http://www.vilaweb.cat/media/attach/vwedts/docs/op_banner_analysis_released.pdf  p. 
46, para 431. 
14 As above, namely R v Thain (1984) R v Clegg (1993) (acquitted on retrial in 1999) 
and R v Fisher and Wright (1995).  
15 C. Ryder (1991) The Ulster Defence Regiment: An Instrument of Peace? Methuen 
suggests that 18 UDR soldiers were convicted of murder and 11 of manslaughter during 
the Troubles p.150.   
16 http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/no-imbalance-of-approach-
in-decision-to-prosecute-troublesrelated-cases-35409088.html 
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The Historical Enquiries Team (HET), Legacy Investigative Branch (LIB) and Challenges 
Related to Historical Prosecutions 
In 2004 the then PSNI Chief Constable, Sir Hugh Orde established the Historical 
Enquiries Team (HET). Its remit was to re-examine all Troubles-related deaths 
between 1969 and 1998. Using contemporary policing techniques, this ‘family 
focused’ initiative had two principal tasks (i) to present families with a report into 
the circumstances of the death of their loved one and (ii) where possible, to gather 
evidence with a view to prosecuting those responsible. The HET was ultimately 
wound up following a critical report by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 
(HMIC) which found that the HET’s reviewing of historical cases involving members 
of the army and police was inconsistent with Article 2 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (discussed further below). 17 
 
There has been considerable confusion recently about the number of cases that 
the PSNI have dealt with involving different groups of protagonists and 
consequently the PSNI have recently published figures in the media. These state 
that:  
 
The HET completed reviews of 1,625 cases, which related to 2,051 
deaths; of these 1,038 were attributed to republicans, 536 to 
loyalists, 32 to the army, and 9 cases where it is not known.18   
 
The HET ultimately formalised a two-stage process whereby reviewed cases would 
be referred internally within the PSNI for further investigation. The HMIC report 
was highly critical of how this process had been applied regarding military cases, 
stating that it was ‘striking’ that in the HETs work “not one state involvement case 
relating to the British Army has to date been referred to the PSNI for further 
investigation or for prosecution.”19  
 
Whilst a small number of convictions did result from the HET investigations it 
remains the case that not one single member of the security forces has been 
convicted to date as a result of a legacy investigation into a conflict-related death.  
 
Following the HMIC report and similarly critical research by Professor Patricia 
Lundy, the then Chief Constable, Matt Baggott, took a decision in 2013 to direct 
that all 238 military killings that had been in the remit of the HET be the subject 
                                                 
17 HMIC (2013) Inspection of the Police Service of Northern Ireland Historical Enquiries 
Team. London: HMIC. 
18Troubles legacy cases bias disputed by figures BBC News Online 2 February 2017,   
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-38844453  
19 HMIC report p25. 
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of a fresh investigation. These cases are now part of the caseload of the PSNI 
Legacy Investigations Branch (LIB).20  
 
The LIB caseload reportedly involves 530 killings carried out by republicans, 271 
by loyalists, 354 by the security forces, and 33 other killings (a total of 1,188).21 
As is discussed further below, the reason for the comparatively high number of 
security force killings still ‘in the system’ may be largely due to concerns about 
whether previous investigations were in fact lawful.  
 
The LIB is clearly not considering all of these cases at once, and it had been 
planned that both its work and that of the Ombudsman’s legacy unit would be 
subsumed in to the Stormont House Agreement Historical Investigations Unit 
(HIU). In relation to live case load the LIB currently has four teams: team A is 
examining the ‘On the Runs’ inquiry, in relation to 238 republicans; team B is 
examining two republican cases and the activities of the Military Reaction Force 
(MRF), further to revelations from that unit in a Panorama documentary; team C 
is dealing with the killings of 14 civil rights demonstrators on Bloody Sunday by 
the Parachute regiment and the killings of 10 civilians by the IRA in the 1976 
Kingsmills massacre; a final team, D, is dealing with 7 killings attributed to 
republicans.22 
 
In an important case before the Northern Ireland High Court on Friday March 3rd 
2017, Mr Justice Maguire held (in a case involving allegations of the involvement 
of the Army’s Military Reaction Force in shooting an unarmed civilian in 1972) both 
the HET and the LIB lacked the required elements of independence to perform an 
Article 2 compliant investigation of the case. He concluded (para 109):  
 
‘….there is no evidence to suggest that the deceased was other 
than a wholly innocent person who was in the wrong place at the 
wrong time. However the awkward truth in this case is that the 
system for investigating serious crime has let her and her family 
down over a period of decades now23  
 
The significance of this and related cases is discussed below. 
                                                 
20 Questions to the Chief Constable to the Policing Board Northern Ireland ‘Killings during 
the Troubles by the army’, 2 February 2017.  
https://www.nipolicingboard.org.uk/sites/nipb/files/media-files/written-response-to-
questions-for-2-February-2017-Meeting.pdf  
21 Troubles legacy cases bias disputed by figures BBC News Online 2 February 2017,   
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-38844453 
22 As above.  
23 Re Margaret McQuillan in Matter of Review by the HET into the Circumstances of the 
Death of Mrs Jean Smyth and Other Suspected British Army Military Reaction Force 
Killings. 3rd March 2017. REF 15/57619/01 
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Evidential and Legal Difficulties with Regard to Historical Prosecutions 
There are very significant legal and evidential challenges related to prosecuting 
people for historical events, particularly events which occurred during such a 
violent conflict as Northern Ireland. Sir Hugh Orde, former Chief Constable of the 
PSNI, has given a vivid account of the difficulties of investigating such historical 
crimes.  Speaking about the recovery of evidence by the Historical Enquiries Team 
(HET) – the body he established to conduct historical investigations in Northern 
Ireland - he said: 
 
The likelihood of solving cases was clearly going to be slight. 
Witnesses would be old or dead. Exhibits, if still available, could be 
contaminated or inadmissible. Informants and agents would be in 
the mix; the original paperwork incomplete or missing... At the 
height of the Troubles, 497 people were murdered in one year. The 
forensic laboratory was blown up twice. Numerous police stations 
were blown up, stations housing much of the investigative material. 
... The fact that evidential opportunities lost at the time would be 
hard to recover did not render the initiative worthless. We had to 
shift the focus to ensure that, mindful of our primary role as 
investigators, the driving force behind this initiative would be to 
deliver a meaningful outcome for the families.24 
 
Sir Hugh and his successors in the PSNI, and indeed the team who were involved 
in the working on the HET (and now the PSNI Legacy Investigative Branch) have 
always been careful to emphasise these and related difficulties with historical 
investigations, not least to responsibly manage the expectations of the affected 
families. In addition to overcoming the investigative challenges, such prosecutions 
must pass the DPP prosecutorial test i.e. the evidential test whether there is 
sufficient evidence to offer a ‘reasonable prospect of a conviction’ and whether it 
is in the public interest that such a prosecution be taken. 25 Finally, if historical 
prosecutions do reach court, one would expect defence counsel in many such 
cases to raise the delay in such proceeding as an abuse of process which would 
prejudice the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Cumulatively therefore, the bar for 
successful prosecutions for historical troubles related cases remains quite high.  
                                                 
24 Sir Hugh Orde, War is Easy. Peace is the Difficult Prize, Longford Lecture, London, 2 
December 2009. Available at: http://www.longfordtrust.org/lecture_details.php?id=6. 
25 PPSNI Code for Prosecutors, para. 4.1.2, available at: 
http://www.ppsni.gov.uk/Branches/PPSNI/PPSNI/Files/Documents/Code%20for%20Pros
ecutors/Code%20for%20Prosecutors%20Revised%202008%20FINAL.pdf.  For a detailed 
discussion on the meaning and relevance of public interest in such cases See G. 
Anthony, K. McEvoy, L. Mallinder, and L. Moffatt (2015) Investigations, Prosecutions and 
the Public Interest. Belfast: Queens University Human Rights Centre.  
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‘Thorough’ Investigation, Statute of Limitations and Troubles Legacy Cases 
Another issue which I have been asked to address is whether any statute of 
limitations with regard to prosecutions could be introduced after investigations. In 
the recent House of Commons debate on this matter Sir Jeffrey Donaldson framed 
the matter thus:  
 
The Government must therefore give urgent consideration to 
introducing a statute of limitations for soldiers and police officers 
who face the prospect of prosecution in cases that—this is very 
important—have previously been the subject of full police 
investigations. Let me clear about that: we are talking about cases 
that were previously the subject of rigorous police investigations 
relating to killings and deaths that occurred before 1998. …This is 
not an amnesty, as each case will have previously been the subject 
of a thorough investigation.’26 
 
As noted above, I would respectfully disagree with Sir Jeffrey’s assertion that a 
statute of limitations which removed the prospect of prosecution could be 
distinguished from an amnesty. More importantly however, Sir Jeffrey does make 
the important point that consideration of such a measure would only occur in the 
wake of a ‘full’, ‘rigorous’ and ‘thorough’ police investigation.  
 
There has been quite a lot of consideration about what constitutes such an 
investigation in Northern Ireland. Indeed the lack of such investigations in some 
historical cases (as illustrated above by Mr Justice Maguire) has significantly 
undermined the work of both the HET and the LIB. 
 
By way of illustration, in the period between 1970 and 1973 there was an RUC 
Force Order in place. The latter reflected an agreement between the GOCNI and 
the Chief Constable which meant that police officers investigating a death caused 
by a soldier never got to interview the soldier in question. Such interviews were 
conducted by the Royal Military Police (RMP) rather than the investigating 
detectives. The purposes of these investigations have been described in HET 
reports and other sources as ‘managerial’.27  This was the period when over 150 
                                                 
26 Sir Jeffrey Donaldson, Armed Forces: Historical Cases Debate, House of Commons 23rd 
February 2017. 
27 See HET report into the fatal shooting of William McGreanery by Grenadier Guards in 
Derry, September 1971. Available at: 
http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/cases/mcgreanery.pdf. This describes the work of the 
RMP Investigator as seeking ‘information for managerial, not criminal purposes. The 
Saville Inquiry into the killings on Bloody Sunday also highlights how it is also noted that 
the Saville Report also highlights how RMP questioning was conducted for ‘managerial’ 
purposes rather than for independent ‘criminal’ investigations. See ‘Saville inquiry: Over 
150 killings by soldiers during Troubles in Northern Ireland never fully investigated’ The 
Guardian, 20 June 2010. 
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of the approximate 300 army killings took place. The practice was stopped in 1973 
at the insistence of the recently appointed Director of Prosecutions Sir Basil Shaw, 
himself a former soldier. In case heard by the then Lord Chief Justice Lowry the 
following year, the LCJ noted: 
  
‘This practice has been discontinued, but we deprecate this 
curtailment of the functions of the police and hope that the practice 
will not be revived.’ 28  
 
However, no decision was taken at the time to review those investigations which 
had taken place between 1970 and the ending of the practice 1973.  
 
There is clear authority from the domestic courts that RMP investigations did not 
meet legal requirements under Article 2 of the European Convention (discussed 
below). For example, the case of a judicial review take by the family of Kathleen 
Thompson (a civilian 47-year old mother of six children who was shot dead by a 
single shot to the chest whilst standing in her back garden by a member of the 
Royal Green Jackets on the 6 November 1971) is instructive. Mr Justice Kerr held 
that judged by the standards that applied in 1971-1972 the necessary procedural 
safeguards to ensure adherence to Article 2 compliance were not complied with. 
The ruling stated that the RMP interview of the soldier who fired the shot did not 
satisfy the investigative duty. The legal authority of the RUC to delegate the 
investigative function to the RMP was questioned, and the judge pointed to 
interviews not lasting more than half an hour and discrepancies in the statements 
made which were not subject to further investigation as sufficient to demonstrate 
the inadequacy of the investigation. He added: 
  
By any standard it is clear that the investigation into the death of 
Mrs Thompson was not effective.  Even allowing for the constraints 
that might have obtained at the time and the difficulty in visiting 
the locus where the shooting happened, I am satisfied that a more 
rigorous examination than in fact took place ought to have 
occurred.29 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Northern Ireland Law Reports/1974/R v FOXFORD - [1974] NI 181 
29 In the Matter of an Application by Mary Louise Thompson for Judicial Review [2003] 
NIQB 80   
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The Criteria for Reviving an Investigation 
There has also been detailed consideration in Northern Ireland legacy-related 
cases concerning in what circumstances an investigation should be revived. The 
Article 2 duty to reinvestigate cases where there is new evidence is set out in a 
Northern Ireland case – Brecknell v UK. Concerning the question of when a fresh 
investigative obligation is triggered the Court took the view that, whilst this not 
the case with any assertion or allegation, the duty did apply: 
Where there is a plausible, or credible, allegation, piece of evidence 
or item of information relevant to the identification, and eventual 
prosecution or punishment of the perpetrator of an unlawful killing, 
the authorities are under an obligation to take further investigative 
measures. 
 
The Court explicitly set out that this included information that highlighted defects 
in a previous investigation stating “given the fundamental importance of this 
provision, the State authorities must be sensitive to any information or material 
which has the potential either to undermine the conclusions of an earlier 
investigation or to allow an earlier inconclusive investigation to be pursued 
further.” 30  The aforementioned Judicial Review into the killing of Kathleen 
Thompson has also established that deficiencies in previous investigations mean 
that the Article 2 investigative duty has not been discharged in such 
circumstances.  
Is It Possible To Design An Amnesty Which Is Compliant With The European 
Convention On Human Rights? 
The Article 2 requirements for an effective investigation require that such 
investigations must ‘be capable of leading to the punishment of those responsible’ 
but do not include a specific requirement that the perpetrators be punished.   
Among the few cases in which amnesties for violations of Article 2 have been 
considered is the European Commission on Human Rights’ admissibility decision 
in Dujardin and others v France. The case was taken by the families of some 
unarmed gendarmes (military personnel tasked with policing duties) who were 
killed in a politically-motivated attack by rebels on the island of New Caledonia, a 
French overseas territory. The rebels were subsequently granted an amnesty by 
the French government. The families were seeking a declaration that the amnesty 
was incompatible with their rights under Article 2 of the Convention. In declaring 
that the application was inadmissible the Commission stated: 
 
‘…as with any criminal offence, the crime of murder may be covered 
by an amnesty. That in itself does not contravene the Convention 
                                                 
30 Brecknell v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR, paragraphs 70-71.  
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unless it can be seen to form part of a general practice aimed at the 
systematic prevention of prosecution of the perpetrators of such 
crimes…The Commission considers … that the amnesty law, which is 
entirely exceptional in character, was adopted in the context of a 
process designed to resolve conflicts between the various 
communities of the islands.  It is not for the Commission to assess 
the advisability of the measures taken by France to that end. The 
State is justified in adopting, in the context of its criminal policy, 
any amnesty laws it might consider necessary, with the proviso, 
however, that a balance is maintained between the legitimate 
interests of the State and the interests of individual members of the 
public in having the right to life protected by law.’ 
The decision in the Dujardin case was issued in 1991, sometime before the Court 
developed its jurisprudence on the procedural obligations to investigate under 
Article 2. However, the reasoning of the Commission in Dujardin has been followed 
by the European Court of Human Rights in its 2012 Tarbuk v Croatia judgment. In 
this case the applicant, Dušan Tarbuk, was arrested and placed in pre-trial 
detention in 1995 on suspicion of having committed espionage during the 1991-5 
conflict in Croatia. With the passing of the General Amnesty Act 1996, the criminal 
proceedings against him were discontinued. Following his release, he launched 
civil proceedings for damages in relation to his detention. During the civil case, 
the amnesty was amended to prevent any compensation claims for detention in 
cases where the amnesty had been applied.  In its judgment, the Court was not 
asked to rule on the legality of the amnesty itself. However, it chose to reiterate 
the position adopted by the Commission in the Dujardin case, stating: 
 
‘even in such fundamental areas of the protection of human rights 
as the right to life, the State is justified in enacting, in the context 
of its criminal policy, any amnesty laws it might consider necessary, 
with the proviso, however, that a balance is maintained between 
the legitimate interests of the State and the interests of individual 
members of the public.’  
 
Although the Court has not yet been asked to address directly whether an amnesty 
for Article 2 violations is permissible under the Convention, the above rulings 
suggest that the Court may grant states broad discretion in this area. Nonetheless, 
the judgment does suggest some criteria that amnesties should meet in order to 
be permissible: 
  
• The amnesty should be exceptional in character, meaning that it is designed 
to address particular events or a particular group of offenders and does not have 
wider application or is not reflective of a general practice of impunity within the 
state, which may undermine the rule of law or public confidence in legal 
institutions. 
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•  The amnesty should be necessary, meaning that the state is enacting the 
amnesty in order to fulfil its legitimate aims. The example of the French amnesty 
for New Caledonia suggests that amnesties enacted to contribute to the peaceful 
resolution of armed conflicts may fulfil this criterion. 
 
• The interests of individual members of the public are respected. This can 
relate to their interests in having their right to life protected by the end of conflict 
or the application of criminal law. It may also relate to the interests of victims and 
society to know the truth about the violations. 
 
• The amnesty must not impede the fulfilment of the state’s duty to conduct 
effective investigations into Article 2 violations as outlined above. However, where 
amnesty coexists with or is used to support investigative processes, this may be 
compatible with Article 2, provided that the investigative processes are 
themselves compliant with the procedural obligations under Article 2. 
 
The Court has not been asked to rule directly on amnesties that have been granted 
for violations of Article 3 (torture, inhuman or degrading treatment). However, in 
a series of judgments the Court has opted to articulate its views. Firstly, in the 
2004 Abdülsamet Yaman v Turkey case which involved allegations of torture 
against a 12-year old boy by the Turkish police, the Court stated in relation to a 
hypothetical amnesty that: 
 
‘where a state agent has been charged with crimes involving torture or ill-
treatment, it is of the utmost importance for the purposes of an ‘effective 
remedy’ that criminal proceedings and sentencing are not time-barred and that 
the granting of an amnesty or pardon should not be permissible.’ 
 
This contrasts strongly with the more flexible approach towards amnesties for 
Article 2 violations that is articulated in the Dujardin and Tarbuk cases. 
The Early Release Provisions of the Good Friday Agreement 
The early release of prisoners was a key element in the negotiations on the Good 
Friday Agreement.  The Agreement states that both British and Irish governments 
would put legislation in place to provide for the accelerated release of prisoners 
convicted of scheduled offences in Northern Ireland (or similar offences for those 
convicted elsewhere). It stipulated that those who qualified would be released 
within two years of the passing of this legislation.  The legislation excluded 
prisoners who were supporters of organisations which were not then maintaining 
a ceasefire. The Early Release Scheme was enacted through the Northern Ireland 
(Sentences) Act 1998. Under this scheme, qualifying prisoners have to apply to 
the Sentence Review Commissioners for early release. All prisoners have to satisfy 
a number of conditions in order to be eligible:  
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(a) they have to have been convicted of a qualifying offence (i.e. a scheduled 
offence within the meaning of the Emergency Provision Act 1973 as amended)  
 
(b) they must not support an organisation not on ceasefire;  
 
(c) upon release they would be unlikely to become a supporter of a specified 
organisation or  
 
(d) become involved concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation 
of acts of terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland.   
 
(e) Life prisoners have to satisfy a fourth condition that if released they would 
not be a danger to the community.   
 
The terms of the Agreement were that all qualifying prisoners would be released 
within two years of the signing of the Accord. Prisoners released under this scheme 
are released on license – for those individuals who are on a fixed term sentence 
until the date when they would have been released normally, and for life-
sentenced prisoners, for the rest of their life. As of 2013, 482 prisoners were 
released early under the scheme, 21 of whom were recalled as having breached 
the terms of their license, approximately half of whom were for alleged re-
involvement in paramilitary activities. 
 
Two matters are of direct relevance for current purposes; 
 
(i) There were two soldiers in prison at the time of the passing of the Act who 
had been convicted of murder. It was originally considered that they would apply 
to have their sentences reviewed and their releases ordered by the Sentence 
Review Commission. However it appears that these soldiers were ultimately 
released using the Royal Prerogative of Mercy.  
 
(ii) In recent years an anomaly has become apparent in the operation of the 
Northern Ireland Sentences Act. Given that the Act refers specifically to scheduled 
offences from 1973 onwards, it appears that anyone convicted of a conflict related 
offence before 1973 is liable to serve a full sentence rather than the two year 
maximum for anyone convicted for offences committed between 1973-1998. As is 
discussed below, a review of the operation of the Northern Ireland Sentences Act 
might present one option to address some of the concerns of the Committee.  
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Conclusion   
 
This discussion document is designed to assist members in their deliberations on 
former soldiers and legacy related matters in Northern Ireland. The British army 
was deployed in Northern Ireland to uphold the rule of law and many of its 
members paid a heavy price towards that objective. It is possible in my view to 
find ways to address legitimate concerns in this area while still ensuring that the 
rule of law remains sacrosanct. Two broad options are outlined below.   
Option One: A Statute of Limitations 
A statute of limitations which sought to bar criminal prosecutions and or civil 
liability with regard to the Northern Ireland Troubles against individuals or 
categories of individuals would be an amnesty by another name.  It is possible to 
design an amnesty which is lawful, and compliant with international and domestic 
legal obligations. 
  
• It would have to be part of a genuine effort to deal with the legacy of the 
past.  
 
• It could not be done at the cost of negating the rights of victims under 
Article 2 or 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights to an effective 
investigation into what happened and to possible reparations.  
 
• Even if the conditions on ensuring the rights of victims were met, it would 
be difficult to apply such an amnesty to state actors alone while meeting 
the state’s legal obligations in international law to prevent impunity.     
 
In addition to these legal challenges, it would face significant political difficulties. 
Such an amnesty would be outside the terms of the Stormont House Agreement. 
It was not advanced by any of the parties to that Agreement – including the British 
government which has historically been opposed to such amnesties – and would 
represent quite a dramatic departure in policy for the British government. It would 
also probably mean the collapse of the Stormont House Agreement which has 
taken years to negotiate. Such a collapse would mean that the victims of the 
Troubles in Northern Ireland who have waited for decades for truth, justice and 
accountability would again be disappointed. Moreover, the ‘state-centricity’ of 
some of the existing mechanisms (e.g.  the Office of the Police Ombudsman) would 
continue. 
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Option 2 Implement the Stormont House Agreement and Review the Northern 
Ireland Sentences Act (1998) 
A more attractive option in my view would be to implement the Stormont House 
Agreement in full, ensuring that its mechanisms (particularly the Historical 
Investigations Unit) are Article 2 compliant in terms of providing an independent, 
effective, prompt and transparent investigation into past events. In order to 
protect the rule of law in the jurisdiction the police involved in the HIU 
investigations should be allowed to do their work independently and follow the 
evidence wherever it leads free from all political interference. Similarly, if there is 
sufficient evidence, cases should be referred to the DPP and he\she should make 
a determination on whether or not to prosecute individuals in the normal fashion. 
Such cases should then be adjudicated by a judge, again in the normal fashion, 
and again ensuring that the rule of law is upheld.  
 
In addition to allowing rule of law to run its course as envisaged under the terms 
of the Stormont House Agreement, the government could propose in the ongoing 
negotiations to review the operation of the Northern Ireland Sentences Act. As 
noted above, given that there is an anomaly with regard to pre 1973 offences, 
such a review is arguably warranted in any case. It should be possible to include 
in the criteria to be assessed by the Sentence Review Commission (the body which 
determines the amount of time to be spent in prison) a number of additional 
criteria including the age and health of the defendants, the time since the offence 
was committed.  
 
In addition, there is an additional mechanism envisaged under the Stormont 
House Agreement, the Independent Commission on Information Retrieval (ICIR). 
The latter is designed to allow victims to seek information from state and non-
state actors about the Troubles related deaths of their next of kin. None of the 
information given to this body is admissible in legal proceedings. However, it might 
be possible to envisage a process whereby any person who provided information 
to the ICIR would have their evidence reviewed and triangulated to determine as 
far as possible its accuracy. Any such person who was investigated by the HIU, 
convicted and sentenced could ask for some form of certification from the ICIR 
that they had cooperated fully with the ICIR and the latter could be included as 
an additional criteria to consider a sentence reduction by the Sentence Review 
Commission.       
   
 
